Introduction: Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World by Luckham, Robin
Wide gaps have opened between a global vision
of a more prosperous and secure post-Cold War
world and the dismal realities of violent conflict
and chronic poverty experienced by a significant
proportion of the world’s population. These gaps
reflect failures of understanding and conflicts of
interest, as well as resource constraints and poor
implementation. Security, like development, is
all too often seen as something the North
delivers through its policy interventions and aid
programmes, rather than as the product of
changes in the developing South, reflecting the
priorities and interests of those most at risk.
This issue of the IDS Bulletin aims to redress this
imbalance. It brings together articles presented
at the inaugural Colloquium of the Global
Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST)
held at Kandalama, Sri Lanka in September
2007. The Consortium aims to transform
existing state-centred security paradigms by
rethinking security from the point of view of poor
and vulnerable people and communities in the
developing South.
Security is a new and indeed rather suspect
concept for development practitioners. They
have good reason for caution, for security is a
highly contested idea, meaning very different
things to different people (Luckham 2007). It
first arose from the theory and practice of state
sovereignty and inter-state relations in Western
Europe and North America. It was (and still
remains) preoccupied with the security of states
within a state system dominated by a few large
powers. Decolonisation embedded security
within post-colonial statehood but it became
confused with the security of regimes, and the
privatisation of state power in the service of elite
wealth accumulation. National security was
deployed as a doctrinal fig-leaf for authoritarian
regimes, which prioritised state secrecy and
resisted accountability to citizens. Aid and
military alliances cemented peripheral states
into the security architecture of the Cold War
with profound effects on their state structures,
power relations and development.
Yet, security is not and should not be the sole
prerogative of the state. Even Hobbes, whose
Leviathan, written in the seventeenth century at
the conclusion of the English Civil War, is widely
seen as an apologia for the all-powerful sovereign
state, grounded the latter upon a social contract
with its citizens: the state guarantees the safety
of citizens; and they in turn deliver unconditional
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loyalty to the state. The great Islamic historian
Ibn Khaldun also defined the state in relation to
the people it governed. Max Weber’s definition
of the state in terms of its monopoly of legitimate
violence conveys much the same message. For
him, as for Hobbes, the bedrock of the state’s
power is its legitimacy, along with its capacity to
assure the safety and security of its citizens.
The most important reason why the development
community should engage with security issues is
that they are far too important to be left to
security specialists alone. Military and security
spending have immense opportunity costs,
diverting resources from development.1 War and
insecurity are major causes of poverty and
human misery in their own right, tending to
generate ‘development in reverse’ (World Bank
2003). Coercion underpins the system of power
and profit driving global capital accumulation
and international development. States assure the
political stability required for development to
take place. Hence, when they fracture or ‘fail’
the first priority of state reconstruction is ending
political violence and restoring minimum
conditions of security.
The relationships between security and
development were highlighted during the Cold
War by the Brandt Commission (Brandt Report
1980), North–South: A Programme for Survival and
by the Palme Commission (Palme Report 1982)
Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. But
they had little policy impact in an international
context dominated by the confrontation between
capitalist and socialist blocs. Development
analysis and practice mostly turned a blind eye to
war and insecurity, or treated them as exogenous
shocks, which might disrupt or delay
development, but were not intrinsic to it.
The end of the Cold War and the ‘Third Wave’ of
democratic transitions raised hopes of a new era
of peace, democracy and prosperity, which were
dashed almost as soon as they were voiced. There
was no durable peace dividend to shift resources
from military spending to development. New
sources of insecurity replaced the old, trapping
many poor countries in cycles of conflict and
poverty. Transitions to democracy displaced
authoritarian regimes, only to spawn new forms
of disenfranchisement. Major powers flirted with
the multilateral vision of a more equitable and
rule-based global order, only to fall back on tired
imperial patterns characterised by displays of
military force and the ‘war on terror’.
Globalisation brought limited progress towards a
more open and equitable international economic
system, but at the same time created new
markets in illicit commodities (including drugs)
and privatised security. While some developing
countries became more competitive in the global
economy, others sank deeper into poverty,
violence and insecurity.
Nevertheless, there is an apparent international
commitment to engage with the sources of
insecurity. Both the UN Report on A More Secure
World (UN 2004) and its follow-up In Larger Freedom
(UN 2005) affirmed the ‘indivisibility of security,
economic development and human freedom’ in
the words of the former. International
interventions in violent conflicts have become
more frequent and more robust. They not only
aim to hold combatants apart, as in ‘first
generation’ peacekeeping, but also to prevent and
end violent conflict, build peace and reconstruct
‘fragile’ states. The priorities of aid programmes
include good governance, peacebuilding and post-
conflict reconstruction alongside economic
development and poverty reduction. Donors,
international financial institutions (IFIs) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) all directly
engage with security issues, for instance under the
rubrics of ‘Disarmament, Development and
Reintegration’ (DDR) of ex-combatants, ‘Security
Sector Reform’ (SSR) and ‘Security, Safety and
Access to Justice’ (SSAJ) programmes.
Yet, whether in reality vulnerable people have
become more secure, human suffering has been
reduced, or personal freedoms have increased, is
hotly disputed. Critics argue that the ‘new
humanitarianism’ has been cut to the cloth of
corporate and global power interests.
Development has been ‘securitised’ (Duffield
2001; Willett 2005) and subordinated to Western
anti-terrorist and security agendas; without
substantially modifying security priorities to
foster development and poverty reduction. Major
global actors talk the talk of the international
community’s ‘responsibility to protect’
vulnerable people failed by their own states in
countries like Zimbabwe or Burma (ICISS 2001),
whilst failing to deliver on their humanitarian
commitments, or manipulating them to pursue
hegemonic agendas as in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Global corporations affirm principles of
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corporate responsibility, whilst many of their
activities continue to inflame resource wars and
privatise security provision.
Rethinking security demands innovative yet
rigorous empirical analysis of the sources of
insecurity in a world divided by profound
inequality and ongoing conflict. At the same
time, it should identify the spaces which exist
for change, in order to empower as well as
protect those most at risk. This issue of the IDS
Bulletin is a first step towards such an analysis.
1 Whose security? Rethinking security from
below
The challenge posed to contributors to this IDS
Bulletin was to rethink security from below, i.e.
from the point of view of the most vulnerable,
excluded and insecure. As Abello Colak and
Pearce describe (in this IDS Bulletin), a new
language for talking about security has emerged
since the end of the Cold War, centred around
two key concepts, namely ‘human security’ and
(especially in the Latin American context)
‘citizen security’. The former draws on the vision of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
seeing security as an entitlement of all human
beings, including both ‘freedom from fear’ and
‘freedom from want’ (Commission on Human
Security 2003). Citizen security is understood
more narrowly as an entitlement of citizenship
claimed from the state. Both emphasise that the
state should protect vulnerable people from
violence and insecurity, whatever its source
(including the state itself). Both connect to
another key claim, that states (and by extension
the international community) have a
‘responsibility to protect’ people and communities
from extreme violence, insecurity and human
rights abuses (ICISS 2001). They also imply a
further idea explored in this IDS Bulletin, that
security is a public good.
Human (and citizen) security allows a powerful
critique of state security and the dominance of
force in international relations. Yet it has faced
extensive criticism (summarised and partly
rebutted by Jolly and Basu Ray 2007): for
cramming all forms of human vulnerability into
a single concept, blunting its analytical edge and
policy impact; for glossing over relationships of
power and interest; and for legitimising
international intervention in ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’
states (see Woodward, this IDS Bulletin).
Our concern, however, is slightly different.
Whose security and from which threats are we
talking about? Human security (and less so
citizen security) posits a flattened world of
individuated human beings facing generic
threats to their life, freedom and dignity, who are
in need of protection. But as contributors to this
IDS Bulletin demonstrate, insecure and excluded
people perceive security in very different ways
from the dominant narratives and indeed from
each other – be these women who have
experienced extreme violence and rape in
Liberia (Gbowee); ‘garment girls’ in Sri Lanka
(de Mel); campesinos and rural schoolteachers in
Peru using pishtacos (evil spirits) as a metaphor
for the dangers of the external world (Wilson);
or urban residents of Communa 3 in Medellin,
Colombia, coping with mafia and criminal
violence (Abello Colak and Pearce).
The narrative of human security, in sum, should be
grounded more firmly in the lived experience of people
who are insecure, as well as the political, social and
economic realities of countries in the global
South. This is essential for four main reasons:
First, because security itself is unequally distributed,
reinforced by discriminations between rich and poor
countries, among social classes, against women and
minorities, and spatially between regions or between
slums and suburbs, etc. In this IDS Bulletin, Chillier
and Varela suggest that the police act as ‘border
guards’ against the ‘dangerous classes’, trapping
the ‘torturable poor’ in conditions of violence and
insecurity. De Mel describes how the exploitation
of ‘garment girls’ in Sri Lanka and their sexual
submission to ‘military boys’ is reinforced by a
militarised state as well as an export economy
dependent on women’s labour.
Second, to recognise the agency of those who suffer
insecurity, violence and poverty and the many different
ways they struggle not just to cope, but also to assert their
rights and speak truth to power. This IDS Bulletin
provides several examples: Gbowee describes
how women activists and refugees barricaded the
Liberian peace talks to shame leaders of the
armed factions into reaching a viable peace
agreement. Hattotuwa contributes a fascinating
analysis of the ways new electronic media
counterbalance an increasingly repressive Sri
Lankan state, using swabhasha (vernacular) blogs,
text messages and photos taken on mobile
phones to disseminate information, document
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rights abuses and respond to emergencies,
including the tsunami. Tariq argues that Jirga and
Arbakai (traditional justice and community
policing institutions) remain legitimate and
surprisingly effective in south-east Afghanistan,
at least partially immune to the violence and
chaos surrounding them.
Third, to ensure that security from below is grounded in
sound empirical understanding rather than over-
romanticised perceptions of grassroots institutions and
initiatives. Not everything that transpires at
grassroots or in (un)civil society is benign or
conducive to the security, wellbeing and
empowerment of the poor and oppressed.
Traditional institutions may offer stability, but
also reinforce discriminations on the basis of
religion, minority status or gender. The only
effective protection on offer in zones of conflict
or urban slums may be that provided by
warlords, militias, paramilitaries, religious
extremists, or criminal mafias – but it comes at a
heavy price for vulnerable people. For example in
Peru, Sendero Luminoso purported to challenge the
state and landlord interests on behalf of
excluded Quechua-speaking peasants, but ended
up subjecting them to a reign of terror.
Fourth, because the poor may see the state itself as
complicit in the insecurity visited upon them: whether
by incorporating traditional and grassroots
organisations in its own webs of patronage; by
subcontracting violence to non-state militias (as
in Sudan); by directly planning, perpetrating or
inciting mass violence as in the Rwandan
genocide (McLean Hilker 2009, forthcoming); or
via the complex symbiosis between state police
and criminal gangs found in cities like São Paulo,
Medellin, Johannesburg or Mumbai. Survey data
in Latin American countries (summarised by
Fuentes, in this IDS Bulletin) suggest that
working class respondents are more likely than
members of the middle class to support mano dura
(iron fist) policies towards crime over human and
citizen rights.
In sum, there are many vantage points from
which to perceive security from below, and not all
of these sit comfortably with human rights and
human security agendas as currently defined. It
is argued here that a new conception of security from
below should complement not substitute for security as a
public good, i.e. it should be based upon voice
within not exit from the public arena. Abello
Colak and Pearce argue that security provision
should be informed by shared norms and shared
values; it should reflect the real concerns of
vulnerable people; and it should also be
respectful of human and citizen rights. The
concept of citizen security arguably articulates
these concerns more precisely than human
security, linking security to active citizenship,
human rights and democratic governance.
2 The gendering of (in)security
Human security, as Chenoy (this IDS Bulletin)
argues, has tended to be gender-blind. Yet
conceptions, practices and experiences of security
and insecurity are deeply gendered. In all modern
states military and security institutions embed
masculinities at the heart of political power. De
Mel’s deconstruction of the ‘military turn’ of the
Sri Lankan state is especially interesting, showing
how militarisation has interacted with the
subordination of women in the capitalist
international division of labour.
Women are widely seen as being most at risk
from domestic, criminal and political violence,
including the use of rape as an instrument of
war, as both Gbowee and Chenoy describe. Yet,
although the majority of perpetrators are men,
in some contexts women too play key roles in the
promotion and perpetration of violence (for
example female Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka,
female Hindu militants in India, women
fundraisers for the Rwandan Patriotic Front, as
well as female genocide perpetrators). Equally,
although women often suffer disproportionately
from insecurity, marginalised men – especially
young men, as in Palestine – are often the direct
targets of violence.
Neither the emergence of the field of ‘gender
security’, nor the highlighting of violence against
women as a human rights issue, nor declaratory
frameworks like UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace
and Security have seriously challenged the
prevailing gender inequalities in security
decision-making. It is important to ensure that
women are better represented; that they play an
active part in peace processes as in Liberia; that
they exert real influence in the day-to-day
democratic control of security institutions; and
that they challenge and reshape the dominant
security discourses. As Chenoy contends, these
are not arguments to dispense with the concepts
of human and citizen security; but rather to write
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new narratives within them, which recognise the
specific inequities faced by women, as well as
their agency in struggles for peace and justice.
3 Identity-based violence and the securitisation
of identities
Security interconnects in complex ways with how
nations, groups and individuals imagine
themselves. In recent years, there has been an
apparent global increase in ‘identity-based’
violence – violence that appears to be perpetrated
by and targets individuals on the basis of ethnic,
religious, political or other identities. Wilson
argues, however, that it is hard to conceive of
violence that is not in one form or another
identity-based, since victims are normally singled
out as dangerous, unworthy of respect or
insignificant (mere ‘collateral damage’ from the
point of view of those using force).
Analysis of identity-based conflicts has tended to
be dominated by a now rather tired debate
between those who see them as rooted on the
one hand in ‘primordial’ cultural differences,
‘ancient enmities’ or insurmountable ‘clashes of
civilizations’ such as between Islam and the West
(e.g. Huntington 1996)2 and on the other hand,
those who argue that cultural values are simply
instrumentalised for the purpose of struggles
over land, resources and political power.
Both perspectives are challenged by McLean
Hilker (2009, forthcoming) in an IDS Working
Paper, which complements this IDS Bulletin, and
by Al-Sayyid here, in the context of the Arab
world. McLean Hilker contends that neither
approach does justice to the complex social and
political causes of identity-based violence,
although both have consequences for policy. The
first ‘primordialist’ approach tends to prioritise
compromises, which institutionalise the
differences among identity groups, like the
Dayton Accord in Bosnia and the Taef Accord in
Lebanon, both of which have to a large extent
frozen rather than addressed underlying
conflicts. The second approach tends to be
reductionist, failing to ask why ethnic, religious
and other identities have symbolic and ideological
resonance, and why they form a powerful basis for
mobilising groups for collective action, including
violence. Elements of both approaches are
combined in Stewart’s (2008) concept of
‘horizontal inequalities’, i.e. economic, social and
political inequalities between culturally defined
groups. However, it is important to recognise
that, in practice, vertical inequalities also tend to
be expressed as cultural hierarchies, like the
marginalisation of the ‘Quechua-speaking many’
in Peru, described by Wilson in this IDS Bulletin.
The key issue here is to understand, in different
contexts, how exclusion and insecurity are
structured around markers of identity and then
become politicised to the point of violence.
In the Arab world, as Al-Sayyid shows, the
interconnections between identities and violence
are not straightforward. In some countries, like
Morocco, Syria and Jordan, the main question
indeed is why salient identity differences have not
generated serious political violence. In others,
like Sudan, regional, religious and ethnic divides
act as mutually reinforcing conflict-multipliers.
Sectarian divisions within the same religion have
also spawned violence as in Iraq and Lebanon,
where competing factions within each religion
forge alliances across the religious divide. In
Algeria on the other hand, struggles over the
control and nature of the state, rather than
between identity groups, have driven protracted
violence. Al-Sayyid argues here that identities
formed around membership of political
movements like Ba’ath, the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO) or Hamas have been just as
important as cultural identities in mobilising
people politically for violence; interestingly he
classifies mainstream Islamist movements like
the Muslim Brotherhoods as essentially political
rather than identity based.
States are by no means innocent bystanders in
the dramas of identity politics. They tend to
imagine themselves through overarching
narratives about their history and identity, like
the traditional symbols of Sinhala nationhood
invoked by the Sri Lankan state and military (as
described by de Mel), which marginalise the
country’s Tamil-speaking and other minorities.
States and their security establishments often
perceive challenges to the dominant narratives as
being charged with security threats. Enloe (1980)
has argued that security elites tend to visualise
security through cognitive maps, which identify
which groups can and cannot be trusted: for
example the widespread use of ethnic, etc.
profiling by police. The ‘war on terrorism’ (itself
an ideological construct) has politicised identities
still further, re-categorising minority protests and
political religion as dangerous to international
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order; and blurring the boundaries between
dissidence, crime and terrorism, as Fuentes (in
this IDS Bulletin) suggests. Yet as Al-Sayyid insists
in the Arab context, the appropriate response to
politicised religious or other identities may not be
to target them as threats, but to accommodate
them as far as possible within mainstream
democratic politics, so that they do not become
radicalised into political violence.
4 The real politics of security reform
The starting point of this IDS Bulletin is that
security is a precious entitlement of citizens, not
a gift from an often errant, repressive or absent
state. At the same time, transforming security
requires substantial change in the security
institutions responsible for delivering security
(the armed forces, police, intelligence agencies,
paramilitary formations, etc.) to ensure they
meet the needs of citizens – and at the very
minimum do not become agents of insecurity in
their own right. Given the central role of these
institutions in maintaining state power and
controlling political and criminal violence, this is
an essentially political task.
It is also an extremely difficult and contested
task. It tends to be complicated by severe risks of
policy paralysis or regression – especially in
contexts of violent conflict as in West Africa
(Olanisakin) or Sri Lanka (Bastian); where there
are deep legacies of authoritarian rule as in the
Arab world (Kodmani and Chartouni-Dubarry);
and even where new forms of ‘uncivil democracy’
have arisen from democratisation, as in Latin
America (Fuentes).
Much of the policy discussion has been
dominated by donor policy instruments like SSR,
SSAJ and (in post-conflict contexts) DDR of ex-
combatants – all drawing upon models of ‘best
practice’ evolved on the basis of (largely3) donor
experience in transitional and post-conflict
countries. Contributors to this IDS Bulletin differ
in their assessments of the usefulness of such
models. But all agree that reforms will fail if they
are not rooted in the history and experience of
particular regional and national contexts.
Moreover, they argue that new approaches to
security require informed understanding (a) of
the real politics of change within contested
political spaces and (b) of how security
institutions themselves function as bureaucratic
constituencies able to block reform, turn it to
their advantage or (in best case scenarios) lend it
their professional authority and support.
Fuentes, for example, describes how in Latin
America rights-based approaches to citizen
security have often run into opposition from
powerful pro-order political coalitions allying the
police and armed forces with populist politicians.
Such coalitions not only enjoy formidable
advantages in resources and organisation
compared with human rights groups but they can
also count on considerable popular support,
notably among the urban working class,
demonstrating the complexity of security reform
even in electoral democracies.
This complexity is further illustrated in the case
of Sri Lanka, where Bastian argues that the
problems are not purely political, but also rooted
in the political economy of development. His
analysis of the interconnections between state
coercion, the shift towards a neoliberal economy
and the civil war waged against Tamil insurgents
is reinforced by de Mel’s account of the
exploitative relationships between the ‘military
boys’ of the armed forces and the ‘garment girls’
of the export sector. Moreover, electoral
competition has reinforced the exclusion of the
country’s minorities, despite changes in the
electoral system to improve their representation;
it has frustrated SSR initiatives; and played a
major part in derailing the peace process. Spaces
for dissent still exist in the new media and
elsewhere, but their main focus is exposing
human rights abuses and containing the drift
toward authoritarianism – rather than reform of
exclusionary state and security institutions.
In the Arab region, as Kodmani and Chartouni-
Dubarry (this IDS Bulletin) contend, the space
for change is even more constrained due to the
region’s long history of authoritarian governance,
politically powerful (and secretive) security
institutions and massive external intervention,
most recently as the epicentre of the ‘war on
terror’. Neither the security environment nor the
politics of the region are conducive to civilian
oversight, transparency and accountability of
military and security institutions; and external
promotion of reform is viewed with
understandable suspicion. Kodmani and
Chartouni-Dubarry suggest here that the best
strategy is an indirect one, building on the
activities of human rights and civil society groups
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to expose abuses and corruption in security
agencies; and exploiting the limited openings
available in countries like Morocco and Jordan,
which are taking the first tentative steps towards
political reform.
5 Privatisation of security: between state and
market
Tilly (1992) asserts that coercion and capital have
been interlinked and in tension with each other
ever since the emergence of the modern state.
Weapons have been a staple of international trade
for centuries; and the military–industrial complex
is a long established feature of global capitalism.
At the same time, as argued in this IDS Bulletin by
Isima, the relationship between the two is being
transformed in fundamental ways by
globalisation, which is subjecting the state and the
public domain to the requirements of global
markets. The global marketplace for force (Avant
2005) now covers military and security services as
well as weapons. Neoliberal economics is being
introduced in the security sector, reshaping the
relationships between the latter and civilian
institutions in a great variety of ways as both de
Mel and Bastian (this IDS Bulletin) show in the
case of Sri Lanka. Private is displacing state
security provision to the point where many states
are losing their monopolies of violence to a very
diverse range of ‘non-state actors’: private security
firms, mercenaries, militias, self-defence forces,
vigilantes and even criminal mafias.
Security privatisation raises many challenges for
development. First, it poses, in an acute form, an
issue, which has become central in other areas of
development policy. Can and should public goods
like security, water or health be delivered by the
private sector? Does this distort priorities and
undermine the entire conception of security as a
public good as well as undermine the
development of the social contract between the
state and its citizens? Or can security be ‘co-
produced’ by the state and private sectors in ways
that ensure there is still public control over the
use of force as well as accountability to citizens?
A related issue is whether security privatisation
reinforces inequalities between the secure rich
and the torturable poor, adding to the
vulnerability of those unable to pay for
protection. There are no simple answers,
especially in countries where the capacity of the
public sector to provide even basic justice and
security cannot be assumed. Where patrimonial
states merely protect elite interests, trample on
the rights of the poor and marginalised, or are
simply absent from significant parts of national
territory, citizens may have little alternative but
to find other ways of assuring their own safety.
But the Janus face of privatised security can be
privatised insecurity. Recent analysis of the
sources of violent conflict in the developing world
has shown that the violence is often market-
driven, with participants responding to economic
incentives, such as the contraction of
employment opportunities for young men or
access to ‘lootable’ or high-profit resources like
conflict diamonds and drugs (World Bank 2003).
Of course privatised violence is only part of the
story and conflicts have multiple roots. Yet,
fundamental issues are raised about the capacity
of states to deliver security even in countries
considered to be stable democracies. In India, for
example, turf wars between criminal mafias in
Mumbai (alongside grievances concerning
Kashmir and politicised religion) were a major
factor in the November 2008 terrorist assault on
the city, whose security impacts reverberated far
beyond Mumbai itself.
Where privatised insecurity is embedded
throughout the entire polity, the implications may
be still more deadly. In Afghanistan, as described
by Tariq, the drug economy has entrenched the
grip of warlords over the state; it has fuelled
corruption, frustrating meaningful reform in state
security institutions; and it has financed Taliban
military operations against government and
NATO forces. At the same time, Tariq is careful to
distinguish between the privatised insecurity of
the warlords and the security and justice
institutions of local communities (Jirga and
Arbakai), which offer an alternative public sphere
to that of the discredited state. That is, the
privatisation of security is not the same as
informal security provision by non-state
community or local institutions. The latter
(though not without its own problems) does not
raise the same issues concerning the
appropriation of security by private interests.
6 Multilevel governance of security in a
globalised world
Security (and peace) is a global as well as a
national public good. It has large externalities
along with diffuse benefits, which are in principle
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shared globally (Kaul et al. 1999: xix–xx). And it
requires collective action between and within
states. At the same time, many of the major
security challenges facing the world today are
not military in nature and increasingly spill
across national boundaries. Existing state-based
international and regional security architectures
face significant challenges in managing problems
arising from trans-border flows of weapons,
combatants and refugees; transnational criminal
activities; environmental degradation; increasing
pressures on water and other shared resources;
and (currently) coping with the fallout from
global financial crisis. As we have seen, these
architectures are challenged as well by the view
that security is an entitlement of citizens, and
more widely of all human beings. Today, security
is spoken of by many voices and is defined in
diverse ways by different social actors connected
globally across national and regional boundaries.
But considered from below, the dominant
narratives of security are often disempowering,
and dependent on decisions and social forces
over which those most affected have next to no
control. The insecurities facing a displaced
widow in Liberia or Eastern DRC could be traced
back in many directions: via the linkages
between illegal mining of diamonds, timber or
coltan to global consumer markets; via the
violence perpetrated by militias armed with
AK47s to neighbouring states acting as conduits
and international small arms markets; via the
flawed and inadequate efforts of international
peacekeepers and NGOs struggling to restore a
semblance of order and deliver relief to decisions
made in the UN and by Western governments.
Ladders of (in)security is a useful metaphor for the
multiple interconnections4 across national
boundaries and spanning North and South.
These ladders do not bridge neutral spaces. They
span vast (but shifting) asymmetries in power
and wealth, giving rise to different discursive
constructions of security. Decisions taken in
international agencies, governments and
corporate boardrooms in the North reverberate
throughout the global South. Yet vulnerable
people affected by these decisions have next to
no ability to influence them, nor to hold those
responsible accountable.5
Moreover, when the ladders of insecurity cross in
the reverse direction in the form of refugee
influx, terrorism or piracy, they tend to be
depicted by Northern policymakers and media as
threats arising from chaos in the developing
world (IPPR 2008). To use a simple illustration,
for Somali fishermen coping with war, famine
and overfishing by foreign trawler fleets, piracy
is a livelihood strategy, albeit one which now
supports an entire so-called ‘criminal’ economy.
But foreign shipping interests, regional states
and Western powers regard it (with some
justification) as a rising security threat.
Yet one should not assume in advance that
Southern attempts to reverse cycles of insecurity
are doomed to failure, even in apparently
unfavourable conditions of regional insecurity,
governance breakdown and trans-border conflict.
This is the conclusion of Olonisakin’s analysis of
civil society activism in West Africa. Almost in
spite of themselves, West African states have
initiated a series of initiatives designed to stem
existing conflicts in the region, prevent their
spread, control the flow of small arms and
implement elements of a human security agenda
– in part because of successful lobbying by civil
society groups of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and other
regional organisations. This also illustrates the
potential of multilevel coalitions for change.
Civil society groups that had been unable to
make a significant impact on security governance
in their own national contexts were able to
increase their leverage by cooperating across
national boundaries and working with regional
bureaucratic constituencies.
To maximise the impact of such multilevel change
coalitions, it is crucial to understand how global
and regional security hierarchies are constructed,
their strengths and contradictions and where
they are open to influence and challenge. In an
IDS Working Paper published in conjunction with
this IDS Bulletin, Bagayoko re-evaluates the
argument that humanitarian and development
issues are increasingly ‘securitised’. She suggests
that security policymaking in the North tends in
reality to be far from homogeneous, reflecting a
cacophony of divergent policy discourses, each
following their own policy logics. In the complex
conflicts of countries like the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kosovo, Liberia or
Afghanistan, military forces, aid agencies,
humanitarian organisations and their local
counterparts work alongside each other but
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sometimes at cross-purposes because of their
inherently conflicting methods and objectives.
The stereotyping of all Northern actors as
complicit in an overarching imperial presence
oversimplifies a far more complex reality. It is
crucial for Southern decision-makers and policy
activists to understand the contradictions of
Northern policymaking in order to have any
chance of influencing or developing alternatives
to it.
Woodward explores the asymmetric relationships
between coercion and capital at the global level in
her analysis of the USA’s efforts to convert its
military dominance into durable hegemony
following the end of the Cold War. Under President
George W. Bush the USA conflated its global
responsibilities as a superpower with a neoliberal
economic agenda and a narrow vision of US
national interests, to the ultimate detriment of all
three. However, the re-categorisation of the
developing South, rather than the communist East,
as the main perceived source of security threats
had started even before the end of the Cold War.
Multilateral as well as unilateral approaches have
configured security hierarchies around the major
alliance systems and economic blocs, notably
NATO and the European Union (EU), prioritising
the interests of the larger powers and of corporate
capital. Although in principle the UN epitomises
the idea of security as a global public good, it is
pitifully under-resourced relative to the
expectations placed upon it. Its own governance
arrangements build disparities in military power
and wealth into the Security Council system,
disenfranchising even larger Southern states
(excepting China). It is hardly surprising that the
UN’s promotion of human security and its efforts
to create a mandate for humanitarian intervention
through the international ‘responsibility to protect’
should sometimes awaken the suspicion of
Southern governments.
The limits of security constructed around US and
Western hegemony and presupposing
overwhelming military force have been cruelly
exposed in the disastrous interventions in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In the long run, structural
changes in the global political economy – and in
particular the emergence of alternative centres
of economic accumulation and global influence,
such as China and India – are likely to make the
existing security architecture seem even more
outdated. A more plural international system,
Woodward argues, would facilitate new political
coalitions across North and South and better
reflect Southern security concerns.
Nevertheless, one should not assume that such
changes would necessarily address the rights and
needs of the insecure and the dispossessed. It is
entirely possible that more, not less, emphasis
might be placed on state security and
sovereignty, reflecting the suspicion, if not
hostility, of some Southern governments towards
current formulations of human rights, human
security and the ‘responsibility to protect’. But at
least human security would no longer be seen as
a blessing to be conferred on a supplicant South
by a liberal interventionist North. The
responsibility would be firmly in the hands of the
citizens of Southern states to assert their rights
as citizens and as human beings.
This IDS Bulletin provides inspiring examples of
how active citizens, civil society groups, media
and social movements have mobilised to
challenge accepted definitions of security and to
work for the rights of the vulnerable and
oppressed. But the issue remains of how such
often-isolated efforts can be aggregated to
construct an embryonic global public able to
ensure security is truly treated as a public good
rather than managed as if it were an asset of
powerful states and global capital.
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Notes
* I wish to thank Lyndsay McLean Hilker for
her insightful comments on more than one
version of this introduction.
1 The relationships between military spending
and development include growth-stimulating
as well as growth-depressing impacts –
although the latter tend to predominate in
poorer developing economies.
2 Mamdani (2005) and Sen (2006) are among
many who contest the stereotyping of Islam as
a source of violence.
3 The theory and practice of SSR, DDR, etc. have
to a large extent been donor-driven. Yet the
ground was prepared by initiatives in the South
(including those of networks of civil society
activists, security practitioners and researchers
constructed by some of the GCST’s own
1Luckham40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:17  Page 9
partners). Donor paradigms have drawn
heavily on Southern ‘success stories’, notably
South Africa’s defence transformation process.
4 Some economists use the term ‘value chains’
to characterise global–local economic
interconnections. But in a security context,
the same metaphor (‘security chains’) might
have been open to misunderstanding.
5 The idea of international accountability is
complex, as Grant and Keohane (2005) argue,
and it seldom involves accountability to those
at grassroots level most affected by the
decisions of international agencies, donor
countries, INGOs or international firms.
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